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Abstract: In this paper, I investigate the scalar semantics of evalua-
tive adjective in general, and of good in particular. Lassiter (2017) 
has argued that good, when taking propositions as arguments, has an 
interval scale. I argue that there’s evidence in support of the view 
that good, when taking individuals as argument, has a scale that is 
stronger than interval, but weaker than ratio. In particular, I propose 
that individual-level good has a “round” ratio scale, which allows a 
broader set of ratio transformations than standard ratio scales. This 
conclusion is consistent with the fact that good admits round ratio 
modifiers (twice as good), but eschews precise ones (# 1.38x as good). 
An important consequence of this view is that the scales of individual 
and propositional-level good are severed.  
Keywords: Evaluative adjectives, scalar semantics; metaethics. 
“All my life I’d heard people tell their black boys and 
black girls to “be twice as good,” which is to say “ac-
cept half as much.” These words would be spoken 
with a veneer of religious nobility, as though they ev-
idenced some unspoken quality, some undetected 
courage, when in fact all they evidenced was the gun 
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to our head and the hand in our pocket.” (Ta-Nehisi 
Coates, Between the World and Me) 
1. Introduction 
 This paper puts forward a puzzle about the semantics of evaluative ad-
jectives, in particular about the adjective good. The puzzle is the following: 
even though good largely eschews measurement, phrases like twice as good 
are perfectly interpretable. What do they mean? And what consequences 
does their acceptability have for the semantics of these adjectives? The 
purpose of this paper is to investigate those questions. 
 Evaluatives1 are gradable predicates, which is attested by the fact that 
they admit ADJECTIVAL MODIFIERS. To see this, compare (1), where a grad-
able adjective (good) is modified, with (2), where a non-gradable adjective 
(hexagonal) is modified (# indicates that the construction is unacceptable): 
(1)  The courtyard is {very} good / {much / a little / better than the 
park}. 
(2)  The courtyard is {# very} hexagonal / {# much / # a little / 
# more hexagonal than the park}.2 
Adjectival modification is a window into the scalar properties of gradable 
adjectives (Lassiter 2017; Sassoon 2010; Solt 2018, a.m.o.). Different modi-
fiers can tell us different things about the scale corresponding to the rele-
vant adjective. For instance, an adjective like tall admits measure phrases, 
while good does not: 
(3)  Ann is 180cm tall. 
(4)  Bill is ??? good. 
                                                 
1  This is a heterogeneous class of adjectives whose most eminent members are good 
and bad, but which also conutains adjectives of moral (virtuous), aesthetic (beautiful) 
and personal taste evaluation (tasty), as well as so-called thick adjectives (cruel). 
2  This does not mean that the sentences in (2) are absolutely unintelligible; but in 
order to recover a meaning one needs to do some interpretative work. For instance, 
the courtyard is a lot more hexagonal than the park could mean that it has a more 
regular and/or carefully delineated hexagonal shape. 
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Interestingly, one would not even know what to fill the blank with. Bill is... 
“2 hours good”? “4 agreeable encounters good”? This suggests that, while 
the scale corresponding to tall, i.e., height, admits of measurement, the scale 
corresponding to good does not. There are no standard measures of how 
good things are.3 
 Regardless, I want to argue that good does not fully eschew measure-
ment. Indeed, my purpose is to show that the scale of good poses a puzzle. 
Among the two most salient scale types used in social sciences, ratio and 
interval, it is difficult to determine which of these corresponds to good. On 
the one hand, if good had an interval scale, it ought to reject ratio modifiers. 
But individual-level good (𝑥𝑥 is good) admits round ratio modifiers (viz. 
Coates’ quote). On the other hand, if good had a ratio scale, it ought to be 
positive with respect to concatenation. This means, roughly, that the com-
bined goodness of any two individuals taken together must be greater than 
the goodness of each individual taken separately. But according to Lassiter 
(2017), propositional-level good (it is good that 𝜑𝜑) is not positive with re-
spect to concatenation. Thus, one is confronted with a puzzle. The way out 
will be to assume that good has a different scale when it takes propositions 
                                                 
3  There are exceptions: one can speak of a swimmer being 6 seconds better than 
another; or a politician doing 3 points better than their opponent on a poll. However, 
it is intuitive to interpret better in those examples as meaning 6 seconds, or 3 points 
greater on some contextually salient scale, which may not be the scale of good. The 
presence of specific units of measurement in those examples indicates as much: 6 
seconds better suggests that better there just means faster; 3 points better indicates 
that better stands for greater. Such reinterpretations can coerce good into admitting 
exact measurements, and moreover, into shifting its scale-type: in both examples, 
better will adopt a ratio scale in virtue of the fact that the relevant properties (speed, 
score on a poll) have ratio scales. Examples abound: Apple performed ... 4.5 times 
better than Blackberry (https://www.tradegecko.com/blog/supply-chain-manage-
ment/apple-the-best-supplychain-in-the-world). Relatedly, Lassiter (2017, p.89) 
discusses an Internet example where a company is described as retaining users 2-3 
times as efficiently as another. Independently of whether efficient or good really are 
ratio adjectives, in these contexts they behave as such and thereby admit the rele-
vant ratio modifiers. I will not, however, rely on examples like these to conclude that 
good allows exact measurement or has a ratio scale. I thank two reviewers for 
pressing me to clarify this. In what follows, I set such coerced usages aside. 
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and when it takes individuals as arguments. In the former case, I will con-
clude with Lassiter that good has an interval scale. In the latter case, how-
ever, there are reasons to conclude that good doesn’t have an interval scale. 
More specifically, I will propose that individual-level good has a scale that 
is stronger than interval, but weaker than ratio, a scale which I call ROUND 
RATIO scale, which admits a broader set of ratio transformations than stand-
ard ratio scales. 
 Before moving on, here is a comment on good. The hypothesis that good 
has a different scale-type when ranging over individuals and when ranging 
over propositions is bound to strike as controversial. But this may seem less 
surprising in light of the fact that the meaning of good is massively under-
specified: good can be interpreted as categorical (unconditional good) or 
hypothetical (good given certain ends or purposes); relatedly, good has so-
called “attributive” and “predicative” uses.4 Moreover, good is judge-de-
pendent (Bylinina 2017) and multidimensional (Sassoon 2013). Similarly, 
good carries a beneficiary argument – as in good for you! (see Stojanovic 
2016, pp. 19-20), and even lives a double a life as an intensifier, as in a good 
dose of luck (Castroviejo and Gehrke 2019). Indeed, Hare (1952, see also 
Umbach 2016) held that the only thing that tied together all uses of good 
was the expression of commendation. In light of such underspecificity, the 
prospect of assigning different scale types to different uses of good may seem 
less striking.5 
 The paper is laid out as follows: in section 2, the typology of scales 
standardly used in linguistics is discussed, and the significance of various 
types of inferences and modifiers is introduced. In sections 3-5, various scale 
                                                 
4  The distinction comes from Geach 1956. See e.g., Asher 2011; Ridge 2014; 
Thomson 2008 for discussion. 
5  However, this invites a further question. Given that its meaning is so open and 
minimal, why the focus on good? Other adjectives (beautiful, ugly, interesting) may 
be a bit more uniform, and thus a more reliable guide to the scalar properties of 
evaluative expressions. Nevertheless, there are reasons to study the semantics of 
good; after all, good/bad are the most basic evaluative adjectives. This is evidenced 
by the fact that all other evaluative adjectives imply good/bad in some way on 
another. Moreover, good/bad are some of the few evaluative adjectives to take both 
individuals and propositions as arguments, which is crucial for my discussion. I thank 
a reviewer for this journal for pressing me in this regard. 
600  Andrés Soria-Ruiz 
Organon F 28 (3) 2021: 596–625 
types are introduced (in order of increasing strength) and rejected as can-
didates for the scale of good. In section 3 it is shown that good cannot have 
a merely ordinal scale. Subsequently, I argue that the hypotheses that good 
has an interval (section 4) or ratio scale (section 5) are problematic. In 
section 6, I propose a solution. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Scale structure 
 Lassiter (2017), Sassoon (2010), and others have resorted to Represen-
tational Measurement Theory (RMT, see Krantz et al. 1971) to explore the 
features of linguistically gradable items. Lassiter in particular focuses on 
epistemic, probability and deontic modals, but also on the evaluative ad-
jective good, while Sassoon 2010 considers a more traditional set of gradable 
adjectives. In this and the following sections, I present the standard typol-
ogy of scales following mainly Lassiter, as well as the relevant linguistic 
tests that can help diagnose the scale type of a scalar item, and we will see 
what best applies to good. 
 In RMT, the properties of scales are studied by considering what math-
ematical operations they support. The outcome of this is a typology of 
scales, or a set of scale types. Lassiter proceeds by attempting to subsume 
the scales lexicalized in various natural language expressions under scale 
types defined by RMT. His procedure is roughly the following: starting from 
the observation that some predicates are gradable, he assumes that they 
denote scalar properties, or SCALES for short. Then, in order to study the 
properties of those scales, he does two things. The first is to observe what 
kind of inferences and modifiers those natural language items allow and 
forbid. The second is to map the various acceptable uses of those scalar 
items onto different mathematical relations over the real numbers, in the 
way that RMT tells us to. Depending on the kind of mapping from natural 
language onto such mathematical relations that are admissible, a scale can 
be subsumed under one or other scale type. 
 For concreteness, let us define a SCALE as a tuple 𝒮𝒮 = ⟨𝑋𝑋,⩾, . . . ⟩ contain-
ing a set of individuals 𝑋𝑋, a binary ordering relation ⩾ and potentially other 
operations. In order to determine the features of 𝒮𝒮, one seeks to define a 
structure-preserving mapping (a homomorphism) 𝜇𝜇 from 𝒮𝒮 onto ⟨ℝ,≥, . . . ⟩ 
Value and Scale: Some Observations and a Proposal 601 
Organon F 28 (3) 2021: 596–625 
(where ℝ is the set of real numbers, ≥ is the usual ordering relation and 
other operations over ℝ might be taken into account). If a function 𝜇𝜇 is a 
homomorphism from 𝒮𝒮 onto ⟨ℝ,≥, . . . ⟩, then 𝜇𝜇 is called an ADMISSIBLE MEAS-
URE FUNCTION of 𝒮𝒮. And to prove that 𝜇𝜇 is an admissible measure function 
of 𝒮𝒮 is to prove a REPRESENTATION THEOREM. Different scale types are then 
distinguished by imposing different representation theorems that the ad-
missible measure functions must satisfy; the more conditions they must 
meet, the more structure the scale has – the stronger the scale is. 
 There is a potentially infinite number of relations that one can define 
over a scale 𝒮𝒮. But the crucial ones for our purposes are the binary ordering 
relation ⩾, which was already mentioned, and the operation of CONCATE-
NATION, (which is represented as ∘). Concatenation allows us to construct 
compound objects from the simple elements in a given domain. For any 
elements 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏 in some domain, 𝑎𝑎 ∘ 𝑏𝑏 is the concatenation of 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏. 
 However, concatenation is not a linguistic operation. In order to repre-
sent concatenation in natural language, it has to be mapped onto some 
model-theoretical relation. Lassiter (2017, p. 39), following Krifka (1989), 
maps it to the set-theoretical operation of JOIN, ⊔, restricted to non-over-
lapping individuals: 𝑥𝑥 ∘ 𝑦𝑦 is defined if and only if 
1. 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦 belong to the same semantic type 𝛼𝛼, and 
2.  𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦 do not overlap. 
When defined, 𝑥𝑥 ∘ 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑥𝑥 ⊔ 𝑦𝑦, where ⊔ is JOIN over domain 𝐷𝐷𝛼𝛼. 
 JOIN maps onto different aggregation operations depending on what do-
main one considers. If one considers individuals, JOIN is mereological sum. 
Thus, for any non-overlapping individuals 𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥 ⊔ 𝑦𝑦 = the complex indi-
vidual formed by 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥 ⊕ 𝑦𝑦. If one considers propositions, given that 
the JOIN operation over the domain of propositions amounts to set union, 
the concatenation of propositions will be their union: for any non-overlap-
ping propositions 𝑢𝑢,𝑣𝑣, 𝑢𝑢 ⊔ 𝑣𝑣 = 𝑢𝑢 ∪ 𝑣𝑣, which is represented linguistically as 
Boolean disjunction. Concatenation is crucial because mapping it to differ-
ent mathematical relations helps define different scale types (in particular 
ratio and interval scales). 
 Lassiter focuses on the three main type of scales used in social and em-
pirical sciences, namely ORDINAL, INTERVAL and RATIO scales. These scales 
602  Andrés Soria-Ruiz 
Organon F 28 (3) 2021: 596–625 
are defined, as I said above, via their admissible measure functions. In order 
to investigate what scale a given lexical item has, one needs to consider 
adjectival modifiers. Adjectival modifiers carry information about the scales 
of the adjectives that they modify. Among the adjectival modifiers that can 
offer insight into scale structure there are measure phrases (two meters, 35 
years), quantity adverbs (much, a little, a lot) and ratio modifiers (twice, 
1.38x). 
 I will focus on patterns of acceptability and unacceptability. If an ad-
jective accepts a modifier, then I will conclude that the adjective has a scale 
at least as strong as to represent the information contributed by the modi-
fier. For example, in the introduction it was shown that (3) is an acceptable 
thing to say. This suggests that the scale of tall accepts units of measure 
based on centimeters (which in turn are based on ratio transformations, cf. 
Sassoon 2010). 
 On the other hand, if a modifier is not acceptable, this implies that the 
scalar information introduced by the modifier is too strong for the relevant 
adjective. For example, ratio modifiers such as 𝑛𝑛-x (𝑛𝑛-times) require an 
adjective with a ratio scale to be interpretable. If they combine with an 
adjective that has a weaker scale, i.e., hot, late or safe, it leads to infelicity: 
(5)  a. # Bowl A is 1.38x as hot as bowl B. 
  b. # Amir came 2x as late as Mora. 
  c. # My neighborhood is 4x as safe as yours. 
As we will see, hot has an interval scale, according to which zero points are 
variable. 1.38x requires a fixed zero point, and this is why it cannot combine 
with hot. The scale of hot does not provide a fixed zero point that 1.38x can 
be interpreted relative to. Nonetheless, making explicit reference to a par-
ticular scale (e.g., Celsius) is a repair strategy for sentences like (5a): 
(6)  ✓ Bowl A is 1.38x as hot as bowl B on the Celsius scale. 
The reason why this qualification is successful is that making reference to 
the Celsius scale introduces the zero point needed to interpret the ratio 
1.38.6 
                                                 
6  To some speakers, sentences like (5a) sound fine. Erich Rast (p.c.) suggests the 
following example: I baked the Beef Wellington twice as hot as Gordon Ramsay said: 
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 I turn now to presenting these three scale types and to consider whether 
the scale lexicalized by good satisfies each of them. 
3. Ordinal scales 
 A scale 𝒮𝒮 that is merely ordinal is such that all that can be said of the 
elements in its domain is how they are ordered with respect to each other. 
For this reason, all measure functions 𝜇𝜇 that preserve the ordering among 
the reals are admissible measure function of 𝒮𝒮. No other structure is repre-
sented; we do not know anything about the distances between elements on 
the scale, for instance, or their respective distances to a zero point. The 
relation of set inclusion is an example of a relation with a merely ordinal 
structure: all the information that set inclusion represents is an ordering on 
its domain. More precisely: 
Definition 1 (Ordinal scale). If a scalar property 𝒮𝒮 = ⟨𝑋𝑋,⩾⟩ is an OR-
DINAL SCALE (disregarding concatenation and other operations), then 
every admissible measure function 𝜇𝜇 that maps 𝒮𝒮 onto ⟨ℝ,≥⟩ is such 
that, for all 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑥𝑥 ⩾ 𝑦𝑦, 𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) ≥ 𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦). 
Any measure function 𝜇𝜇 is an admissible measure function of 𝒮𝒮 as long as, 
to any two elements 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 of 𝑋𝑋 that stand in the ⩾ relation of 𝒮𝒮, 𝜇𝜇 assigns 
numerical values such that the value of 𝑥𝑥 is a number at least as great as 
𝑦𝑦. Definition 1 says nothing about the type of mathematical operation 
that concatenation should be mapped onto. Thus, any mathematical oper-
ation is admissible; it could be addition, subtraction or what have you. 
 To see how this works, consider again the set inclusion relation. Let us 
represent it as a structure ⟨𝒫𝒫(𝑋𝑋),⊇⟩, where 𝒫𝒫(𝑋𝑋) is the power set of some 
set 𝑋𝑋, and ⊇ is the superset relation. If this structure is ordinal, then every 
measure function that maps it onto ⟨ℝ,≥⟩ should satisfy the representation 
theorem above. This implies that any mapping that respects the ordering 
among reals will be an admissible representation of the superset relation. 
                                                 
I set the oven to 200 C instead of 100 C, it’s burnt! This deserves more attention, 
but it’s possible that, in many contexts, certain scales are so prevalent that repair 
strategies such as (6) are not needed. 
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For any two elements 𝑌𝑌 and 𝑍𝑍 of 𝒫𝒫(𝑋𝑋) such that 𝑌𝑌 ⊇ 𝑍𝑍, a 𝜇𝜇 such that 
𝜇𝜇(𝑌𝑌) = 5 and 𝜇𝜇(𝑍𝑍) = 3 is an admissible measure function; another 𝜇𝜇′ such 
that 𝜇𝜇′(𝑌𝑌) = 12,351 and 𝜇𝜇(𝑍𝑍) = −0.0004 also is; but a 𝜇𝜇′′ such that 
𝜇𝜇′′(𝑌𝑌) = 2 and 𝜇𝜇(𝑍𝑍) = 3 will not do, because 2 ≱ 3. The crucial feature of 
ordinal scales is that nothing matters beyond order; which is why, if one 
defines scales by its admissible measure functions, ordinal scales are very 
liberal. 
 Might the scale of good be merely ordinal? Lassiter’s answer (2017, 
p.177), with which I agree, is negative: the scale of good cannot be merely 
ordinal, because in addition to order, the distance between elements also 
matters. 
 The crucial data point here is the admissibility of quantificational ad-
verbs such as much, a little or a lot. Note that there is an interpretative 
difference between the following two sentences: 
(7)  Volunteering is better than donating. 
(8)  Volunteering is much better than donating. 
However vague and variable the meaning of much may be, the fact that one 
can imagine a situation in which (7) would be true while (8) false suggests 
that they do not mean the same thing. 
(9)  Volunteering is better than donating, but not much better. 
Informally, the admissibility of such modifiers imposes the requirement on 
the scale of good that the distance between measures be meaningful: (9) 
says that the value of volunteering is higher than the value of donating, but 
that the distance between them is not “much”. If the scale of better were 
merely ordinal, all measure functions that respect the ordering between the 
two relata should be acceptable. A fortiori, measure functions according to 
which the difference in value between volunteering and donating amounts 
to “much” and measure functions according to which it does not should all 
be acceptable. But if that were so, it would not be possible to represent the 
contrast in truth conditions between (7) and (8). (9) attests such a contrast, 
and therefore the scale of better cannot be just ordinal. 
 More formally, the reasoning is the following: if good had an ordinal 
scale, then for any two elements on that scale that are ordered with respect 
to each other, all measure functions that respect that ordering should be 
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admissible. A sentence like (9) however, admits certain order-preserving 
measure functions but also rules out others, namely those that assign a 
value to each element that is at least as great as whatever quantity much 
stands for: 
(10) (9) = 𝜇𝜇(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣)  >  𝜇𝜇(𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣) & [𝜇𝜇(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣)  −  𝜇𝜇(𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣)]  ≥
̸ 𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚ℎ 
The fact that the truth-conditions of (9) require ruling out certain order-
preserving measure functions suggests that the scale of good must have more 
structure than that of an ordinal scale. Regardless of how one defines much, 
there will be order-preserving measure functions for which the relation in 
(7) holds, but the one in (8) doesn’t – just think of any measure function 
assigning some but not much difference in value to volunteering and donat-
ing. 
 Based on this, one can conclude that good must have a stronger scale 
than ordinal. The reader can check that similar observations apply to other 
evaluative adjectives, as they can all be modified by quantificational ad-
verbs such as much, a little or a lot. The other two salient alternatives are 
interval and ratio scales, in order of increasing strength. 
4. Interval scales 
 Interval scales are stronger than ordinal scales, but weaker than ratio 
scales. They are stronger than ordinal scales because over and above mere 
order, the distance between elements on the scale, that is, their intervals, 
matters. However, they are weaker than ratio scales, because they do not 
determine a zero point, and therefore the positions of elements on the scale 
cannot be defined using ratios. Interval scales take into account the dis-
tance, or gaps, between elements – for this reason, the elements on an in-
terval scale are not actually points, but intervals (although this will not 
matter for our purposes). 
 Temperature, clock time or danger are familiar examples of interval 
scales. Informally, what is crucial about those natural language cases is that 
the scales that those expressions lexicalize do not determine a zero point: a 
“zero” degree of temperature is a mere convention, and changes when one 
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moves from the Celsius to the Fahrenheit scale. Similarly, it is intuitive to 
think that there is no zero point in clock time or in a scale of danger/safety. 
Formally, this is cashed out by making ratio transformations meaningful 
only relative to some arbitrary reference point: 
Definition 2 (Interval Scale). Where 𝒮𝒮 = ⟨𝑋𝑋,⩾,∘⟩ is a scale, if 𝒮𝒮 is an 
INTERVAL SCALE, then the following representation theorem holds for 
every admissible measure function 𝜇𝜇 that maps 𝒮𝒮 onto ⟨ℝ,≥, +⟩: for all 
𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑥𝑥 ⩾ 𝑦𝑦, 
(i) 𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) ≥ 𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦) and 
(ii) for any 𝜇𝜇′ satisfying condition (i) and for any 𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑋𝑋, there are some 
𝑛𝑛,𝑚𝑚 such that 𝑛𝑛 ∈ ℝ+ and 𝑚𝑚 ∈ ℝ, 𝜇𝜇′(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑛𝑛𝜇𝜇(𝑧𝑧) + 𝑚𝑚. 
That interval scales are strictly stronger than ordinal scales is easily seen 
by considering that the set of admissible measure functions according to 
Definition 2 is a proper subset of the admissible measure functions ac-
cording to Definition 1. 
 The crucial linguistic prediction associated with interval scales is that 
ratio modifiers are unacceptable. Recall the following examples: 
(5)  a. # Bowl A is 1.38x as hot as bowl B. 
  b. # Amir came 2x as late as Mora. 
  c. # My neighborhood is 4x as safe as yours. 
Those ratio comparisons are meaningless unless a zero point is defined on 
the relevant scale, but the adjective does not provide one. 
 So, an attractive explanation for why (5a) is odd becomes available: note 
that temperature is measured by scales such as Celsius, Fahrenheit or Kel-
vin. Now, (5a) might be true in a certain scale (say, Celsius). But if one 
moves to a Fahrenheit scale, the ratio 1.38 will be meaningless because the 
conversion between Celsius and Fahrenheit does not preserve ratios. For 
instance, if bowl A is 62.1°C and bowl B is 45°C, one could say that bowl 
A is 1.38x hotter on the Celsius scale than bowl B. But in a Fahrenheit 
scale, those temperatures are 143.78 and 113 respectively, and the ratio 
between them would no longer be 1.38. 
 However, I noted that (5a) can be repaired by mentioning a specific 
scale: if one adds the qualification that one is using a Celsius scale, the 
sentence immediately improves. 
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(6)  ✓ Bowl A is 1.38x as hot as bowl B on the Celsius scale. 
The reason for this is that mentioning the Celsius scale introduces the nec-
essary zero point required to interpret the ratio modifier. 
 Note, in addition, that the comparative size of intervals can be measured 
using ratios. So even though it does not make sense to say that Amir came 
twice as late as Mora, it does make sense to say that Amir was delayed by 
twice as much, or that he stayed for twice as long as Mora. This is because, 
even though the scale of temporal instants does not have a natural zero 
point, the intervals between temporal instants do. 
 Might good have an interval scale? The answer is not straightforward. 
On the one hand, good (and evaluatives in general) eschews precise ratio 
modifiers such as 1.38x.7 In this sense good behaves like interval adjectives: 
(11)  # Volunteering is 1.38x as good as donating. 
However, this is not enough to conclude that good has an interval scale, for 
two reasons. First, attesting the unacceptability of ratio modifiers is not 
enough to determine that the relevant adjective has an interval scale. Pos-
tulating an interval scale is appropriate in the case of temperature or clock 
time, but that is because we know independently how temperature and 
clock time are measured – and, in particular, we know that zero points on 
the relevant scales are arbitrary. This reasoning does not apply to good: we 
do not know whether putative zero points on the goodness scale are arbi-
trary, because – again, setting aside coercive interpretations – there is no 
standard way of measuring value. Given that we lack independent evidence 
for or against the presence of arbitrary zero points on the good scale, we 
cannot conclude from the unacceptability of precise ratio modifiers that 
good has an interval scale. 
 Sec ondly, good (and other evaluatives) admit round ratio modifiers, 
whereas interval adjectives reject them: 
(12)  You have to be twice as good.8 
                                                 
7  Recall that uses in which good is coerced into a ratio interpretation are set aside, 
see n.3. 
8  Adapted from Coates’ quote at the start. 
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(13)  Your daughter is, like, four times more beautiful.9 
(14)  He’d have to be ten times more charming than Arnold.10 
Given this, the same reasoning regarding quantificational adverbs applies 
here. If some ratio modifiers are acceptable, this means that there is an 
interpretative difference between, e.g., better and twice as good. 
(15)  You have to be better than Concha. 
(16)  You have to be twice as good as Concha. 
If so, then the scale of good must be capable of representing this difference. 
However indeterminate the meaning of twice as good may be, the fact that 
one can imagine a situation in which (15) would be true while (16) is false 
suggests that they do not mean the same thing. 
(17)  You have to be better, but not twice as good as Concha. 
As discussed above, if an adjective accepts a modifier, then one can conclude 
that the adjective has a scale at least as strong as to represent the infor-
mation contributed by the modifier. The admissibility of ratio modifiers 
imposes the requirement on the scale of good that ratios be meaningful. If 
the scale of good were merely interval, then it would not be possible to 
represent ratios between degrees. But (17) does represent a ratio between 
value measures, and therefore the scale of good cannot be simply interval. 
However, Lassiter (2017, 89 and ff) has resisted the view that the accepta-
bility of round ratio modifiers is evidence against adjectives like good having 
an interval scale. In his view, round ratio modifiers are hyperbolic and stand 
for interval modifiers such as much or a lot. E.g., ten times more charming 
would be a hyperbolic way of saying much more charming. Lassiter says 
that the fact that those sentences become unacceptable when one adds an 
adverb like exactly points in this direction: 
(18)  You have to be (# exactly) twice as good as Concha. 
(19)  Your daughter is, like, (# exactly) four times more beautiful. 
(20)  He’d have to be (# exactly) ten times more charming than Arnold. 
                                                 
9  Adapted from the series Fresh Off the Boat, season 5 chapter 5, 2018. 
10  Adapted from the movie Pulp Fiction, 1994. 
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But it is one thing to say that these modifiers are hyperbolic, and a different 
one to say that they are really interval. The latter view predicts that such 
modifiers should be admissible with interval adjectives across the board. 
This prediction is not borne out, as twice as hot is just as bad as 1.38x 
hotter (the same goes for (5b)-(5c), barring possible acceptable instances, 
see n.6): 
(21)  # Bowl A is twice as hot as bowl B. 
To avoid this bad prediction, one may reject Lassiter’s exact version of a 
hyperbole view, according to which round ratio modifiers are tantamount 
to interval modifiers. Alternatively, one could say that modifiers like 10x, 
20x or 50x are hyperbolic ways of saying many times. This possibility is 
suggestive when one considers the relative frequency of these modifiers in 
corpora: briefly, “very” round modifiers such as 2x, 10x, 100x and 1000x are 
significantly more frequent than 3x, 4x, 5x, 20x or 50x. This suggests that 
the former might be somewhat idiomatic, and not to be taken as literally 
expressing measurement.11 But even so, if good accepts a modifier like many 
times, this is still evidence that good has a stronger scale than interval, 
contrary to Lassiter. 
 In sum: partially based on his view that round ratio modifiers are hy-
perbolic, Lassiter maintains that good has an interval scale. But his reason-
ing is essentially abductive: given that according to him an ordinal and a 
ratio scale can be ruled out, only interval scales remain as a candidate 
among the type of scales attested in natural language. I have offered an 
argument against the view that good has an ordinal scale (acceptability of 
much); as well as an argument against the view that good has an interval 
scale (acceptability of twice). Lassiter rejects the latter, but I’ve pushed 
back against his alternative view that round ratio modifiers are hyperbolic 
                                                 
11 A search on Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA, https://www.en-
glish-corpora.org/coca/) of a set of round ratio modifiers between 1 and 100, in 
addition to 1000, combined with better reveals that a handful of round modifiers are 
significantly more frequent than others. In decreasing frequency: twice as good (113), 
ten times (84), a thousand times (63), a hundred times (38), five times (18), 
three/four times (15), twenty times (4) and fifty times better (3). I thank a reviewer 
for inviting me to look into this. 
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interval modifiers. However, I haven’t yet looked at Lassiter’s argument 
against good having a ratio scale. To this end, let us move on to ratio scales. 
5. Ratio scales 
 Ratio scales are characterized by the fact that the relative “size” of ele-
ments matters. In particular, difference in size between elements is meas-
ured in ratios, which means that only ordering-preserving measure functions 
that are obtained via a multiplication operation are admissible. In addition 
to this, ratio scales require that concatenation be mapped onto the mathe-
matical operation of addition. That is, the concatenation of two elements 
may only be mapped onto a measure function that assigns to such com-
pound object the arithmetical sum of the individual measures of the con-
catenated elements. 
 Scales like height and weight are familiar examples of ratio scales, where 
the relation between elements in the scale can be mapped onto measure 
functions that maintain a constant ratio between the numerical values as-
signed to them. More formally: 
Definition 3 (Ratio Scale). If a scalar property 𝒮𝒮 = ⟨𝑋𝑋,⩾,∘⟩ is a RATIO 
SCALE, then the following representation theorem holds for every admis-
sible measure function 𝜇𝜇 that maps 𝒮𝒮 onto ⟨ℝ,≥, +⟩: for all 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 and 
𝑥𝑥 ⩾ 𝑦𝑦, 
(i) 𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) ≥ 𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦), 
(ii) 𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥 ∘ 𝑦𝑦) = 𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) + 𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦) and 
(iii) for any 𝜇𝜇′ satisfying (i) and (ii), there’s an 𝑛𝑛 ∈ ℝ+ s.t. for any 𝑧𝑧 ∈
𝑋𝑋, 𝜇𝜇′(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑛𝑛𝜇𝜇(𝑧𝑧). 
Recall that admissible measure functions for ordinal scales satisfy only the 
first of those conditions. Admissible measure functions for interval scales 
satisfy the first condition as well as a “liberal” version of the third, where 
ratios are calculated relative to arbitrary and variable “zero” points. Since 
no reference is made here to such variable, ratios are fixed relative to the 
real zero. Thus, whereas an interval scale admits all ratios calculated taking 
any real as reference point, a ratio scale admits only those calculated rela-
tive to 0. This means that a ratio scale imposes more conditions on the 
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admissible measure functions, and is therefore a stronger scale type than 
ordinal and interval scales. 
 In order to see how ratio scales constrain admissible measure functions, 
consider a familiar example: height. Seeing why the height scale 𝒮𝒮ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑡 is 
stronger than an ordinal scale is straightforward: suppose that Amir is taller 
than Mora. If height were an ordinal scale, one should be able to map Amir 
and Mora’s heights to any pair of numerical values under the > relation. 
But some of those values would radically misrepresent their heights. Sup-
pose that Amir and Mora are respectively 182 and 165 centimeters tall. 
Consider a measure function 𝜇𝜇′ that assigns 𝜇𝜇′(Amir) = 182, 𝜇𝜇′(Mora) =
165, but such that their concatenated heights, 𝜇𝜇′(Amir ∘Mora), is equal to 
17. 𝜇𝜇′ respects the ordering relation between them – i.e., complies with 
condition (i) in Definition 3. But it radically misrepresents the intuitive 
value of their concatenated heights – it doesn’t comply with condition (ii). 
Or consider another measure function 𝜇𝜇′′ that assigns 𝜇𝜇′′(Amir) = 182, 
𝜇𝜇′′(Mora) = 181.9 and 𝜇𝜇′′(Amir ∘Mora) = 363.9. This measure function re-
spects the ordering relation between Amir and Mora – complying with (i), 
and the fact that their combined heights should be the arithmetical sum of 
their individual heights – complying with (ii). But it does not respect the 
intuitive relation that holds between Amir and Mora’s heights, because it 
does not preserve the ratio between their heights. That is, it does not re-
spect condition (iii) in Definition 3. 
 Condition (ii) and (iii) in Definition 3 impose more structure on the 
admissible measure functions for a ratio scale than mere preservation of 
order, and thereby define a stronger scale. In particular, if a scale 𝒮𝒮 is ratio, 
only order-, addition-, and ratio-preserving measure functions are admissi-
ble. 
 I have argued that good cannot have an ordinal scale, and I have argued 
that it doesn’t have an interval scale either. Is the goodness scale a ratio 
scale? There are two considerations against this. First, since ratio scales 
make ratio comparisons interpretable, adjectives that have a ratio scale are 
predicted to admit ratio modifiers. This prediction is borne out for tall, 
which is (independently) known to have a ratio scale: 
(22)  Amir is 1.38x as tall as Mora. 
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Conversely, adjectives that eschew ratio modifiers are predicted to not have 
ratio scales. Such is the case for good and precise ratio modifiers: 
(11)  # Volunteering is 1.38x as good as donating. 
Secondly, ratio scales are by definition POSITIVE with respect to concatena-
tion, and the scale of good is not, according to Lassiter (2017, p. 179 and 
ff). Being positive with respect to concatenation means that the concatena-
tion of any two elements has a greater degree of the relevant property than 
either element. More formally, a scale 𝒮𝒮 = ⟨𝑋𝑋,⩾,∘⟩ is positive with respect 
to concatenation iff for any 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 that do not overlap, 𝑥𝑥 ∘ 𝑦𝑦 > 𝑥𝑥 (except 
if 𝒮𝒮 is lower-bounded, and 𝑦𝑦 has exactly the value of the lower-bound; i.e., 
if 𝑦𝑦 is equal to 0). Lassiter holds that the good scale lacks this property, 
based on the observation that it seems to respect the following inference 
pattern: 
(23)  a. 𝑎𝑎 ⩾ 𝑏𝑏 
   b. 𝑎𝑎 ⩾ 𝑚𝑚 
   ∴ 𝑎𝑎 ⩾ (𝑏𝑏 ∘ 𝑚𝑚) 
If 𝒮𝒮 were positive with respect to concatenation, that inference should fail 
in many instances. But it does not fail for good (by contrast, it very clearly 
fails for likely, which is independently argued to have a ratio scale). For an 
example, consider the following, intuitively valid inference from Lassiter 
(2017, p. 179; recall that concatenation for propositions is disjunction): 
(24)  a. It’s as good for the card to be a spade as it is for it to be a 
heart. 
  b. It’s as good for the card to be a spade as it is for it to be a 
diamond. 
  ∴ It’s as good for the card to be a spade as it is for it to be a red 
card. 
According to Lassiter, that this inference pattern is in general valid shows 
that the scale of good has to be weaker than a ratio scale. 
 Here appears a dilemma. The first horn is that considerations about 
precise ratio modifiers suggest rejecting all scale types as weak as ratio. The 
second horn is that considerations about concatenation suggest rejecting 
any scale type as strong as ratio, since all are positive with respect to  
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concatenation. I propose to solve this dilemma by partially rejecting the 
second horn: Lassiter’s considerations about concatenation apply to propo-
sitional-level good (it is good that 𝑝𝑝), but not to individual-level, or adnom-
inal good (𝑥𝑥 is good). Thus, even though there’s reason to reject any scale 
type as strong as ratio for propositional good, those considerations do not 
extend to individual-level good. In sum, I agree with Lassiter that proposi-
tional-level good has an interval scale, but I’ll propose that individual-level 
good has a scale that is stronger than interval, although weaker than 
a standard ratio scale. 
 When one moves from propositional to adnominal good, the inference in 
(24) arguably fails. Intuitively, this is the case because concatenation for 
individuals is mereological sum, and the sum of two individuals can have 
a higher value than each of those individuals taken separately:12 
(25) a. Car 𝑎𝑎 is at least as good as car 𝑏𝑏. 
  b. Car 𝑎𝑎 is at least as good as car 𝑚𝑚. 
  ∴ Car 𝑎𝑎 is at least as good as car 𝑏𝑏 ⊕ 𝑚𝑚. 
To see how this inference can fail, one can think of good in terms of prefer-
ence: for any two individuals 𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥 is at least as good as 𝑦𝑦 just in case 𝑥𝑥 is 
at least as preferable as 𝑦𝑦. In turn, one may spell this out by saying that 𝑥𝑥 
is at least as preferable as 𝑦𝑦 just in case every time you have the option of 
choosing 𝑦𝑦, you also choose 𝑥𝑥. Understood in this way, premise (25a) says 
that every time you have the option of choosing 𝑏𝑏, you also choose 𝑎𝑎. Prem-
ise (25b) says that every time you have the option of choosing 𝑚𝑚, you also 
choose 𝑎𝑎. But it is consistent with this that if you get to choose the sum of 
𝑏𝑏 and 𝑚𝑚, you may no longer choose 𝑎𝑎 as well. In other words, cars 𝑏𝑏 and 𝑚𝑚 
may have a higher value taken together than taken separately, making the 
premises true but the conclusion false. 
 The key to the contrast between adnominal and propositional-level good 
is, of course, concatenation: concatenation for individuals is mereological 
sum, while for propositions it is disjunction. This has completely different 
                                                 
12  One might disagree about specific cases, perhaps with other evaluative adjecti-
ves. Can the sum of two dishes be tastier than the tastiest of them? Can the sum of 
two pictures be more beautiful than the most beautiful of the two? Perhaps not, but 
a single positive instance suffices to falsify the inference, and it can be found. 
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consequences for the assessment of complex objects. Note that, intuitively, 
the value of a proposition amounts to the value of its outcome. Similarly, 
the value of a disjunction must also amount to the value of its outcome, 
that is, one of its disjuncts. This suggests that the value of a disjunction is 
maximal, that is, a disjunction is no more valuable than its most valuable 
disjunct. By contrast, the value of a mereological sum of individuals is po-
tentially positive, that is, higher than the value of each individual in it. 
 Lassiter relies on examples like (24) to conclude that the scale of prop-
ositional good can’t be ratio, and I agree with his conclusion. But (25) shows 
that this does not extend to individual good. This suggests that proposi-
tional and individual good might have different scales. In the next section 
I will argue that a further observation supports this conclusion, and I will 
propose a stronger scale type for individual-level good than for proposi-
tional-level good. 
6. Round ratio scales 
 In this last section, I want to propose that individual-level good has 
a stronger scale than interval, but not as strong as a standard ratio scale (as 
defined in Definition 3). Informally, the idea is the following: whereas 
a standard ratio scale requires that admissible measure functions preserve 
a precise ratio, which is a positive real, one can define a type of ratio scale 
according to which this requirement is relaxed, so that admissible measure 
functions preserve only an approximate ratio. I will call this type of scale 
a ROUND RATIO SCALE. In practice, this means that a round ratio scale rules 
out less measure functions than a standard ratio scale, and is thereby weaker. 
 To define such a scale, one can impose the requirement that the ratio 
that gets preserved across measures of the same individual is not a positive 
real, but some positive in its vicinity, defined by a HALO. A halo is an 
interval around a number whose size can vary. For example, the halo of 2 
could be the interval [1.9, 2.1], or [1.8, 2.2].13 
                                                 
13  See Lasersohn 1999 on how halos are at play in the interpretation of numerical 
expressions, as well as Hoek 2018; Sauerland and Stateva 2011 for elaboration and 
criticism of Lasersohn’s seminal view. 
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 It is well-known that rounder numbers have greater halos; e.g., 10 has a 
greater halo than 11 or 9; 50 has a greater halo than 49 or 51.14 But what 
numbers are round, and why do they have greater halos? Defining round 
numbers is not as straightforward as it may seem; for my purposes, I will 
rely on the following informal and comparative definition: an integer is 
round just in case it has a larger number of smaller factors than its neigh-
boring numbers (Hardy 1940, p. 48). For example, 10 has more and smaller 
factors than 9 and 11; the same goes for 50 as opposed to 49 and 51. Even 
more informally, one tends to consider rounder numbers that end on one or 
more zeros (relative to a given base), as well as simple multiples or fractions 
of such numbers (Sigurd 1988, p. 249). 
 Regarding the question of why rounder numbers have greater halos, one 
possible answer is that round numbers are cognitively significant (see Rosch 
1975, who characterizes round numbers as a kind of cognitive reference 
points). Alternatively, or perhaps as a result of their cognitive significance, 
round numbers tend to be linguistically simpler (Lotz 1955, see also Krifka 
2002, 2007). The cognitive significance of round numbers, sometimes called 
the round number bias, has been studied in domains such as psychology or 
economics (Lacetera et al. 2012; Lynn et al. 2013; Pope and Simonsohn 
2011).15 
 Having characterized halos and round numbers, let’s now define a round 
ratio scale. The definition is similar to the standard ratio scale, except that 
condition (iii) in Definition 3 above is relaxed, so that admissible ratio 
transformations are restricted, not to those that preserve some real, but to 
those that preserve some real within some other real’s halo. This is achieved 
                                                 
14  This is reflected in loose talk. To take an example from Hoek (2018, p. 175), at 
3:58 it is preferable to say 4 o’ clock than 3:57, even though the latter is closer to 
the truth. 
15  A salient manifestation of the round number bias is the left-digit effect, which 
explains the tendency to price items right below round numbers, such as 3.99€. 
Buyers perceive the difference between 3.99 and 4 as more meaningful than the 
difference between, e.g., 4 and 4.01, and sellers take advantage of it (see Bhattacha-
rya et al. 2012). Another interesting manifestation of round number bias is the strive, 
in sports and other domains, to attain round scores (Lotz 1955; Pope and Simonsohn 
2011). 
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by substituting a fixed ratio for a halo function. A halo function 𝐻𝐻𝑘𝑘 is a 
function from ℝ+ to ℝ+ such that, for any 𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛, 𝑘𝑘 ∈ ℝ+,𝐻𝐻𝑘𝑘(𝑛𝑛) = 𝑚𝑚 just in 
case 𝑚𝑚 is the result of some simple arithmetical operation on 𝑛𝑛 that maps 
𝑛𝑛 onto some number that is no further from 𝑛𝑛 than the halo size of 𝑘𝑘. For 
example, suppose that 𝑘𝑘 = 2. Assuming that the halo of 2 is the interval 
[1.9 − 2.1], whose size is 0.2, there’s infinitely many functions 𝐻𝐻2, all those 
functions that take their argument 𝑛𝑛 to any number no further away from 
𝑛𝑛 than 0.2. Here are some examples of possible functions 𝐻𝐻2 (note that this 
includes the identity function): 
• 𝐻𝐻2𝑒𝑒 = 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛.𝑛𝑛 
• 𝐻𝐻2
𝑗𝑗 = 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛.𝑛𝑛 + 0.1 
• 𝐻𝐻2𝑘𝑘 = 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛.𝑛𝑛 − 0.05 
• ... 
But note that, e.g., a function 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛.𝑛𝑛 + 0.3 is not such a function, as it maps 
its argument further away from the halo size of 2. 
 If, instead of imposing the requirement that admissible transformations 
preserve some ratio 𝑛𝑛, one imposes the requirement that they preserve a 
ratio that results from mapping 𝑛𝑛 to some number in its vicinity, one can 
allow the necessary variability. Let us define Round Ratio Scales as follows: 
Definition 4 (Round Ratio Scale). If a scalar property 𝒮𝒮 = ⟨𝑋𝑋,⩾,∘⟩ is 
a ROUND RATIO SCALE, then the following representation theorem holds 
for every admissible measure function 𝜇𝜇 that maps 𝒮𝒮 onto ⟨ℝ,≥, +⟩: for 
all 𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑥𝑥 ⩾ 𝑦𝑦, 
(i) 𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) ≥ 𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦), 
(ii) 𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥 ∘ 𝑦𝑦) = 𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) + 𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦) and 
(iii) for any 𝜇𝜇′ satisfying (i) and (ii), there are 𝑛𝑛,𝑚𝑚 ∈ ℝ+ s.t., for any 
𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑋𝑋, there’s some function 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚 s.t. 𝜇𝜇′(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚(𝑛𝑛)𝜇𝜇(𝑧𝑧). 
A round ratio scale does not require that the ratios between the measures 
assigned to each individual are held constant across admissible measure 
functions; rather, such ratios are allowed to vary within a certain halo. 
Thus, for instance, given an admissible measure function 𝜇𝜇 such that 𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) =
2 and 𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦) = 1 (for any 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 such that 𝑥𝑥 ⩾ 𝑦𝑦), consider a measure func-
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tion 𝜇𝜇′ such that 𝜇𝜇′(𝑥𝑥) = 4.1 and 𝜇𝜇′(𝑦𝑦) = 2. Given 𝜇𝜇, 𝜇𝜇′ would be inadmis-
sible in a standard ratio scale, since there is no positive real 𝑛𝑛 such that, 
for every 𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑋𝑋, 𝜇𝜇′(𝑧𝑧) = 𝑛𝑛𝜇𝜇(𝑧𝑧). For 𝑥𝑥, 𝜇𝜇′(𝑥𝑥)/𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) is 2.05; while for 𝑦𝑦, 
𝜇𝜇′(𝑦𝑦)/𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦) is 2. Those ratios are not the same, and a fortiori there does not 
exist a single ratio for all measure functions applied across all elements of 𝑋𝑋. 
 But 𝜇𝜇′ is an admissible measure function according to Definition 4. 
The reason is that, even though 𝜇𝜇′(𝑥𝑥)/𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) ≠ 𝜇𝜇′(𝑦𝑦)/𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦), that is, 2.05 ≠ 2, 
there exist halo functions 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚, for some positive real 𝑚𝑚, such that one can 
map either of these ratios, 𝜇𝜇′(𝑥𝑥)/𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) or 𝜇𝜇′(𝑦𝑦)/𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦), to match some positive 
real, namely 2. First, consider 𝑥𝑥. There is a function 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚 such that 𝜇𝜇′(𝑥𝑥) =
𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚(2)𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥). This function, call it 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 , is 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛. 𝑛𝑛 + 0.05. Substituting 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚 for 
𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒  in 𝜇𝜇′(𝑥𝑥) = 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚(2)𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥), we obtain 4.1 = 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛. 𝑛𝑛 + 0.05(2) × 2, that is, 
4.1 = 2 + 0.05 × 2, which is true. Secondly, consider 𝑦𝑦. There is also a func-
tion such that 𝜇𝜇′(𝑦𝑦) = 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚(2)𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦). This function, call it 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚
𝑗𝑗 , is just the 
identity function, 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛.𝑛𝑛. Substituting 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚 for 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚
𝑗𝑗  in 𝜇𝜇′(𝑦𝑦) = 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚(2)𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦), we 
obtain 2 = 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛. 𝑛𝑛(2) × 1, that is, 2 = 2 × 1, which is true. 
 This opens up the possibility that ratios are calculated only approxi-
mately. However, here appears a hurdle: given that the set of reals ℝ+ is 
countably infinite, halos can be of countably infinite size as well. This means 
that Definition 4 does not, after all, rule out any measure function (be-
yond those that fail conditions (i) or (ii)): however different the ratio as-
signed by two measure functions to a pair of individuals may be, their dif-
ference will fall within the halo of some real. For example, suppose again 
that an admissible measure function 𝜇𝜇 is such that 𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) = 2 and 𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦) = 1. 
According to Definition 4, any other admissible measure function 𝜇𝜇′ must 
be such that there exist 𝑛𝑛,𝑚𝑚 ∈ ℝ + such that, for every 𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑋𝑋, there exists 
some function 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚 such that 𝜇𝜇′(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚(𝑛𝑛)𝜇𝜇(𝑧𝑧). The issue is that there will 
always be some positive real 𝑚𝑚 whose halo is as great as required, so there 
is in fact no restriction on how far ratios can come apart. In sum, Defini-
tion 4 above is too weak. 
 Regardless, one can adopt Definition 4 as a template, and use it to 
define different round ratio scales of specific granularity. By assigning a spe-
cific granularity, one determines a maximum halo size that ratio transfor-
mations are allowed to vary within, thereby restricting the admissible meas-
ure functions in a way that strengthens Definition 4: 
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Definition 5 (Round Ratio Scale of 𝑛𝑛-granularity). If a scalar property 
𝒮𝒮 = ⟨𝑋𝑋,⩾,∘⟩ is a ROUND RATIO SCALE OF 𝑛𝑛-GRANULARITY, then the fol-
lowing representation theorem holds for every admissible measure func-
tion 𝜇𝜇 that maps 𝒮𝒮 onto ⟨ℝ,≥, +⟩: for all 𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑥𝑥 ⩾ 𝑦𝑦, 
(i) 𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) ≥ 𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦), 
(i𝑖𝑖) 𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥 ∘ 𝑦𝑦) = 𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) + 𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦) and 
(iii) for any 𝜇𝜇′ satisfying (i) and (ii), there’s an 𝑚𝑚 ∈ ℝ+ s.t., for any 
𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑋𝑋, there’s some function 𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛 s.t. 𝜇𝜇′(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛(𝑚𝑚)𝜇𝜇(𝑧𝑧). 
Thus, for example, if a scalar property has a round ratio scale of 2-granu-
larity, then the absolute difference between the ratios assigned by any two 
admissible measure functions to any pair of individuals cannot be greater 
than 𝐻𝐻(2), that is, [1.9 − 2.1] = 0.2. Recall 𝜇𝜇 and 𝜇𝜇′. Given the measures 
assigned to 𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑋, 𝜇𝜇′ was an admissible measure function according to 
Definition 4. But what about according to Definition 5? It depends on 
whether, for every 𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑋𝑋, there’s a function 𝐻𝐻2 – a function that maps its 
argument to a number no further away from it than 0.2 – such that 𝜇𝜇′(𝑧𝑧) =
𝐻𝐻2(𝑚𝑚)𝜇𝜇(𝑧𝑧), for some positive real 𝑚𝑚. Such functions were already found for 
𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦, namely 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 = 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛. 𝑛𝑛 + 0.05 and 𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚
𝑗𝑗 = 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛.𝑛𝑛, respectively. Therefore, 
given 𝜇𝜇, 𝜇𝜇′ is an admissible function for a round ratio scale of granularity 
2. 
 But consider, by contrast, another measure function 𝜇𝜇″ according to 
which 𝜇𝜇″(𝑥𝑥) = 6 and 𝜇𝜇″(𝑦𝑦) = 2. Is there some positive real 𝑚𝑚 such that, for 
every 𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑋𝑋, there is some function 𝐻𝐻2 such that 𝜇𝜇″(𝑧𝑧) = 𝐻𝐻2(𝑚𝑚)𝜇𝜇(𝑧𝑧)? Recall 
that it’s not necessary for 𝜇𝜇″(𝑥𝑥)/𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) to be identical to 𝜇𝜇″(𝑦𝑦)/𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦), as 
would be the case in a standard ratio scale. Rather, what is needed is for 
those ratios to vary at most by 0.2. In other words, the absolute difference 
between 𝜇𝜇″(𝑥𝑥)/𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) and 𝜇𝜇″(𝑦𝑦)/𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦) has to not be greater than 0.2. But 
since 𝜇𝜇″(𝑥𝑥)/𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) = 3 and 𝜇𝜇″(𝑦𝑦)/𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦) = 2, this in not the case. Thus, given 
𝜇𝜇, 𝜇𝜇″ is not an admissible measure function of a round ratio scale of granu-
larity 2. 
 Importantly, recall that rounder numbers have greater halos. Therefore, 
the “rounder” its granularity, the weaker a round ratio scale will be: a round 
ratio scale of 20-granularity will be weaker than one of 2-granularity, which 
will be weaker than one of 0.2-granularity, and so on. This means that a 
measure function that is not admissible on a given round ratio scale might 
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be admissible on a round ratio scale with rounder granularity. Suppose that 
the halo of 5 is [4.5 − 5.5], that is, 1. As just shown, given 𝜇𝜇, 𝜇𝜇″ above 
would not be an admissible measure function of a round ratio scale of gran-
ularity 2. But 𝜇𝜇″ would be an admissible measure function of a round ratio 
scale of granularity 5. For that, the absolute difference between 𝜇𝜇″(𝑥𝑥)/𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥) 
and 𝜇𝜇″(𝑦𝑦)/𝜇𝜇(𝑦𝑦) need not be greater than the halo size of 5, that is, 1. And 
it isn’t. Therefore, bigger halos make for weaker scales. 
 The proposal is, then, that adnominal good has a round ratio scale of 𝑛𝑛-
granularity. But what 𝑛𝑛? Settling this requires saying something about ratio 
modifiers. A simple way of cashing out the meaning of any ratio modifier is 
to assign to it the presupposition that the adjective with which it combines 
has a ratio scale, and then assign to it the at-issue meaning one would 
expect: 
(26) [[𝑥𝑥 is n-x as A as 𝑦𝑦]] = defined only if A has a ratio scale.  
  If so, [[𝑥𝑥 is n-x as A as 𝑦𝑦]] = 1 iff 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑛𝑛𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑦𝑦) 
According to this simple proposal, ratio modifiers should be acceptable 
across the board with ratio adjectives. This prediction is borne out for 
standard ratio adjectives such as tall, as they admit any ratio modifier. But 
it fails for evaluative adjectives such as good, which admit some ratio mod-
ifiers (2x) but not others (1.38x). 
 However, if one modifies the presupposition of ratio modifiers, so that 
their number indicates the granularity of the ratio scale that they require, 
their acceptability can serve as a guide to the granularity of ratio adjectives. 
Here is a proposal: 
(27) [[𝑥𝑥 is n-x as A as 𝑦𝑦]] = defined only if A has a ratio scale of n-
granularity. If so, [[𝑥𝑥 is n-x as A as 𝑦𝑦]] = 1 iff 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑛𝑛𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴(𝑦𝑦) 
According to this view, ratio adjectives have the granularity of the most 
precise ratio modifier that they accept. Standard ratio adjectives, like tall, 
have maximal granularity, and thus accept any ratio modifier. But other 
adjectives have less-than-maximal granularity. Adnominal good, for exam-
ple, will be of 2-granularity, since this is likely the most precise ratio mod-
ifier that it can admit. More precise ratio modifiers, such as 1.38x, will 
require a ratio scale of 1.38-granularity, which is too precise for good, and 
this is why a phrase like 1.38x better is infelicitous. In turn, since according 
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to (27) ratio modifiers presuppose that their adjective has at least their 
granularity, 𝑚𝑚-x as 𝐴𝐴 will be infelicitous if 𝐴𝐴 does not have a ratio scale of 
at least 𝑚𝑚-granularity. 
 Moreover, I argued that adnominal good is positive with respect to con-
catenation (cf. (25)). Round ratio scales are so as well, so this prediction is 
also borne out. In sum, I am claiming that good, when taking individuals 
as its arguments, has a round ratio scale, which is a type of scale that is 
weaker than standard ratio insofar as it admits more measure functions 
than standard ratio scales. 
 Before moving on, an important question remains: why would evaluative 
adjectives in general, and adnominal good in particular, have scales that 
blur precise ratios? Relying on broad views about vagueness, one may dis-
tinguish three genres of response: metaphysical – because there’s no such 
thing as precise ratios of value, epistemic – because we cannot know objec-
tively where precise ratios are, and psychological – because we are psycho-
logically insensitive to them. Setting aside a metaphysical view, which 
would require much more discussion than I have space for, an intuitive 
justification for going in for an epistemic view would be, perhaps, that we 
simply haven’t yet figured out how to measure value precisely enough in an 
intersubjectively verifiable way. That is, it may be only subjectively possible 
to distinguish 2x as good from 1.9x or 2.1x as good. Intersubjective measures 
of value might just be approximate. This view might be bolstered by the 
fact, pointed out in the Introduction, that good is a judge-dependent and/or 
multidimensional predicate. The idea could be that, even though each of us 
may be able to subjectively determine a standard ratio scale of value – 
perhaps through some operation of dimension aggregation – the best we can 
do to share such measurements with others are rough approximations, that 
nevertheless succeed in preserving the overall scalar architecture.16 
 A psychological view, on the other hand, might be supported by features 
of our perceptual and cognitive system. It is well-known that, even though 
we are capable of representing magnitudes in a mathematically precise way, 
our perceptual system represents magnitudes in an analog fashion, assigning 
                                                 
16  I thank two reviewers for this journal for independently pointing to this hy-
pothesis. See also Sassoon 2010, p. 161 and ff., for ideas in this vicinity. 
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measures to objects that, even though globally covariant with the repre-
sented magnitude, introduce a great deal of probabilistic error.17 It is not 
wholly counterintuitive to think that, even though the linguistic expression 
of many such magnitudes (height, weight, distance) inherit their scalar 
properties from our mathematical capacity to represent precise magnitudes, 
expressions that denote the value of such magnitudes, that is, evaluative 
adjectives, inherit their scalar properties from our imprecise perceptual sys-
tem. 
 Discussing these hypotheses further will have to wait for another occa-
sion. For now, I take it to be at least a competing hypothesis that adnominal 
good has a round ratio scale. By contrast, I conclude with Lassiter that 
propositional-level good has an interval scale. To further support this, note 
the following: whereas a phrase such as twice as good is fairly common, it 
is hardly ever used to compare the value of propositions. Examples do not 
abound,18 and when they are felicitous, they seem to inherit their accepta-
bility from an individual-level comparison. For example, one can say some-
thing like: 
(28) It is good that Camila came to the party. It would have been 
twice as good if she had come with Milica! 
Even though this sentence compares the value of propositions, the aggre-
gated value of Camila and Milica coming to the party cannot result from 
the concatenation of the proposition that Camila comes to the party and 
the proposition that Milica comes to the party, since the concatenation of 
those two propositions is their disjunction. Somehow, the aggregated value 
of Camila and Milica coming to the party is vicariously calculated by ag-
gregating their value as individuals. 
 Assuming that these examples are rare, and derive their meaning from 
an individual-level evaluation, the observation that ratio modifiers are un-
acceptable with propositional-level good is predicted if propositional-level 
good has an interval scale, since twice is too strong for propositional-level 
good. 
                                                 
17  This observation is familiar from the literature on vagueness, see e.g., Égré 2017; 
Fults 2011. 
18  None of the 113 hits of twice as good at COCA apply to propositions. 
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7. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have discussed the scale of evaluative adjectives, and, in 
particular, of the evaluative adjective good. I’ve argued, first, that the lack 
of measure phrases gives linguistic support to the (otherwise natural) view 
that good lacks measurement units. However, good does not eschew meas-
urement altogether. I have argued that there are strong reasons to think 
that the scale of good is stronger than a mere ordinal scale; and I have 
moved on to discuss which of the two most salient candidates discussed in 
the literature is most appropriate for good, an interval or a ratio scale. 
 Interval scales were rejected based chiefly on the observation that eval-
uatives admit round ratio modifiers, but this conclusion was not free of 
controversy, as Lassiter has argued that those are hyperbolic uses. Ratio 
scales, by contrast, were partially rejected based on features of concatena-
tion. Ratio scales are by definition positive with respect to concatenation, 
and it was observed that, while there is no evidence of propositional-level 
good being positive with respect to concatenation, one can argue that indi-
vidual-level good is. Based on this, I proposed to sever the scales of propo-
sitional- and individual-level good: while the former has an interval scale, 
the latter has a ratio scale. More specifically, I’ve proposed that individual-
level good has a ROUND RATIO SCALE, a type of scale that preserves approx-
imate rather than precise ratios, and is thereby stronger than interval, but 
weaker than a standard ratio scale. 
 One potentially controversial aspect of this view remains to be discussed. 
What are the consequences of severing the scale of propositional- and indi-
vidual-level good? As mentioned in the Introduction, this proposal is bound 
to be met with resistance, since there’s prima facie reasons to maintain a 
uniform view about the scalar semantics of good. However, in light of the 
massive underspecificity of good, the prospects of this schism may seem less 
controversial. In fact, the view that “there’s more than one good”, that is, 
that good is ambiguous or polysemous, is perhaps not such a revisionary 
hypothesis in light of the properties of good reviewed in the Introduction. 
Indeed, the arguments put forward in this paper might be seen as support-
ing that general hypothesis. Moreover, the relationship between individual- 
and propositional-level good is understudied, so the view that these  
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evaluatives might have different scales is not at odds with any existing 
proposal that I know of. This divergence may simply be one more among 
other puzzling properties of evaluative adjectives. 
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